Speed enforcement in Norway: Testing a game-theoretic model of the interaction between drivers and the police

  • Published: Accident Analysis & Prevention, Volume 84, November 2015
  • Authors: R Elvik
  • Date Added: 10 Feb 2016
  • Last Update: 10 Feb 2016
  • Format: pdf


To probe the relationship between changes in the risk of apprehension for speeding in Norway and changes in the amount of speeding.


A game-theoretic model of speed enforcement was proposed and tested empirically.

Key Findings:

  • A game-theoretic model of how the rate of violations and the amount of enforcement is determined by the interactions and the police.

  • The model makes predictions both about how drivers will adapt to changes in the amount of enforcement (the more enforcement, the fewer violations) as well as how the police will adapt to changes in the rate of violations (fewer violations leading to less enforcement).

  • Drivers adapt to changes in the amount of speed enforcement by speeding less when enforcement increases and speeding more when enforcement is reduced.

  • Increasing the fixed penalties for speeding is associated with a weak, not statistically significant, reduction of speeding

  • Results suggests that the police adapt the amount of enforcement to changes in the rate of speeding, although the results are not statistically significant.

  • There is no conclusive evidence showing that increasing the fixed penalties for speeding influences enforcement, but the sign of the coefficient is consistent with the game-theoretic model.